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INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the regulation
of cert2in areas of domestic relations, including standing to seek a childcare order, rests within the virtually exclusive province of the states. 1 State lawmakers
recently have undertaken many new domestic relations initiatives relevant to parental and nonparental chj]dcare, prompted, inter alia, by new fonns of human
reproduction, large numbers of non-marital births, and shifts in farnily strnctures.
Herein we review past, current, and future state lawmaking on the availability of
nonparental childcare and child contact orders for grandparents. 2 Our work coincides with the 2017 inquiries into new model childcare laws by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) involving
both parental childcare, via a "Revised Uniform Parentage Act" (RUPA), and
nonparental childcare, via a new "Nonparental Child Custody and Visitation
Act" (NPCCVA). Each model speaks in some ways to childcare by grandparents
fortheir grandchildren. Yet each of these models still fails to adequately address
childcare opportunities for third parties, and there is still progress to be made in
grandparent and other third party childcare law.
We introduce our examination in Part II by describing one grandmother's efforts to maintain her connections with her granddaughter after her
son's-the father's-tragic death. Upon describing Grandma Penny's efforts to
maintain connections with her paternal granddaughter, Sidney, Part III of th.is
article reviews the preliminary work of the NCCUSL. Part IV describes the federal constitutional limits on nonparental childcare orders over parental objections, and in Part V, this article uses current state laws to demonstrate opportunities for grandparent childcare. 3 In Part VI, we explore the key questions facing
state lawmakers considering new grandparent childcare and child contact laws.
In Part VII, we discuss grandparent child contact orders. We find existing laws,
and the NCCUSL models to date, inadequate for the likes of Grandma Penny and
Sidney.

See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents, 90 ST. JOHN'S L.

REV. 965, I 00 L (2016) [hereinafter Parness, Federal Constitulional Childcare].

For data on grandparent childcare of grandchildren, see America's Families and Living Arrangements: 2016: Table C2. Household Relationship And Livi,,g Arrangements OfChildren Under 18 Years, By Age and Sex: 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/families/cps-2016.html (last revised Apr. 6, 2017).
3
We do not review the standards for when such opportunities should be afforded (i.e., need
for detriment to grandchild), where such opportunities may be pursued (i.e., in divorce cases or
through original grandparent childcare petitions), how-if at a\1-postadoption contact agreements
involving grandparents and their grandchildren may be sustained, as in GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-27
(West 2017) (stating adoptive parents and birth relatives may agree to "continuing contact" for
children 14 or older), and the opportunities available in dependency proceedings, as in GA. CODE
ANN. § 15-l l-146(b)(3) (West 2017) (stating placement priority is with ''a relative or fictive kin").
2
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II. GRANDMA PENNY

A. Factual Background
Grandma Penny's battle for visitation with Sidney was long and contentious. It began when Sidney's maternal grandmother, Shirley Skinner, gunned
down Steven Watkins, Sidney's father. 4 At the time of his death, Steven was at
the home of Jennifer, his estranged wife and the mother of Sidney Watkins, to
pick up Sidney for a court-ordered visit. 5 Since then, the paternal grandmother,
Penny Watkins, has fought for visitation with Sidney. 0
Visitation issues began before Steven's death, Shortly after Steven and
Jennifer separated, Steven moved in with his parents, Penny and Dale, 7 At that
time, Jennifer was Sidney's primary caretaker. 8 After the separation, Steven filed
for divorce. 9 Throughout the divorce proceedings, the undertaking of joint parental childcare for Sidney was difficult, as Jennifer and Shirley thwarted the
Watkins' family efforts to visit Sidney. 10 Then, on November 25, 2008, when
Steven came to Jennifer's home to pick up Sidney, Shirley apparently shot Steven dead. 11
However, there has been some speculation in the media that Jennifer shot
Steven, as she was in the house when the murder occurred, she had motive to kill
Steven because she was attempting to keep him away from Sidney, and her story
about the events has been inconsistent. 12 According to Shirley's son, Ed, Shirley
is "taking the rap" for Jennifer. 13 Ed said that Shirley knew Jennifer "would lose
custody of Sidney ... if Jennifer [ Jwas convicted of the killing." 14 Additionally,
prosecutors noted that Jennifer "had the strongest motive to kill her husband"
and that "there was more physical evidence against Jennifer ... than there was
against Shirley." 15 Prosecutors also noted that the police officer who investigated

4
Bruce Rushton, The Faces ofJennifer Watkins, ILL. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016, 12:l l AM) [hereinafter Rushton, Faces of Watkins], http://illinoistimes.com/article-18005-the-faces-of-jenniferwatkins.html.
Id.
6
Id.
Rachel Otwell, Bruce Rushton On: 'The Faces of Jennifer Watkins', NPR ILL. (Dec. 14,
201 6), http://npril lino is .org/post/bruce-rush ton-faces-j ennifer-watkins#stream/o_
8
Lauren P. Duncan, Mercy Plea Last Resort for 78-Year-Old Murder Convict, ILL. TIMES
( Jan. 23, 20 J 4, I 2: 0 I AM), http://illinoistimes.com/article-13 396-mercy-plea-last-resort-for-7 8year-old-murder-convict.html.
9
Rushton, Faces of Watkins, supra note 4.
10
See id.
11
Dwican, supra at note 8.
12
Bruce Rushton, Skinner found guilty; son believes her granddaughter did it, SJR (May 6,
2010, 5: 17 AM), http://www.sj-r.com/xl 38 I 030605/Jury-deliberations-under-way-in-Sk.innermurder-trial.
ll
Id.
14
Id.
is
Id.
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Steven's death had no experience in murder cases. 16 Regardless, Shirley was
found guilty of murder. 17
On December 22, 2009, after Shirley was convicted, Steven's parents
sought to maintain their relationship with Sidney, but Jennifer denied them visitation.18 The paternal grandparents filed a petition in 2009, under the Illinois
grandparent visitation statute, 19 wherein they alleged that they had "a close and
loving relationship with [Sidney] during Steven's lifetime," as they would often
see Sidney during court-ordered visits with him because Steven was living with
his parents. 20 But they said that even these visits were often frustrated by Jennifer. 21 The paternal grandparents requested reasonable grandparent visitation. 22
In 2010, an Illinois circuit court granted visitation, 23 noting that Sidney
would suffer psychological harm otherwise. 24 Additionally, the court found that
the paternal grandparents were best equipped to relate to Sidney what happened
to Steven, with the court and experts opining that the truth about Steven's death
may never be lmown to Sidney without visitation. 25
Rather than comply with the visitation order, Jennifer moved to Florida. 26 There, police arrested Jennifer on March 15, 2011, for failing to follow the
visitation order.27 Jennifer spent six months in jail, 28 while Jennifer's father,

Id.
Id.
18
See id.; see also Watkins v. Watkins, No. 4-10-0759, 201 l WL 10482574, at *l (lll. App.
Ct. Feb. 3,201 !).
19
Watkins, 2011 WL 10482574, at • 1. Consider, as an alternative, a request for a guardianship
appointment. 7 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-3 (West 2017) (identifying persons 4ualified to act
a.~ guardians); id.§ 11-5 (establishing the noons for guardian appoinhnent). However, ifH.B. 3099,
Ill. 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (111. 2017) passes, then the guardianship appointment requirement under section l l-3{a)(2) would change from "lives in the United States" to "is a resident
of the United States," which would include non-American citizens as potential guardians.
20
Watkins, 201 J WL 10482574, at* 1.
21
Id. at "'2.
22
Id. at • 1. The grandparents seemingly would have been foreclosed in seeking a guardianship
via an order deeming Sidney a ward. See, e.g., In re M.M., 72 N.E.3d 260, 269(Ill.2016) (holding
that "[the Juvenile Court] Act does not authorize placing a ward of the court with a third party
absent a finding of parental unfitness, inability, or unwillingness [to provide childcare]").
23
Watkins, 20 l I WL 10482574, at* l.
24
Id. at *5.
25
See id. at •)4; see also Bruce Rushton, Jennifer Watkins Fights for Custody, ILL. TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2017, 12:06 AM) [hereinafter Rushton, Jennifer Watkins Fights], http://illinoistimes.com/article-18141-jcnnifer-watkins-fights-for-custody. html.
26
Otwell, supra note 7; Bruce Rushton, Girl ofMurdered Dad in State Custody, ILL TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2016, 11:16 AM) [hereinafter Rushton, Girl of Murdered Dad], http://illinoistimes.com/article-I 7 7 67-girl-of-murdered-dad-in-state-custody-%7C-si<lney-walkins-cenler-ofvisi tati on-dispute.html.
27
Bruce Rushton, Custody of Watkins Child Transferred to Grandfather, SJR (May 15, 2011,
2:04
PM)
[hereinafter Rushton,
Custody of Walkins},
http://www.sj-r.com/article/201105 l 5/NEWS/305159954.
28
Id.; Rushton, Girl ofMurdered Dad, supra note 26.
16
11
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Robert Webster, had temporary custody of Sidney. 29 After Jennifer was released,
a Florida judge ruled that Jennifer did not have to go hack to Illinois "to face
civil contempt [] and criminal misdemeanor charges." 30
In 2013, Florida police unsuccessfuJly tried to arrest Jennifer via an arrest warrant for contempt of court for interfering with court-ordered visitation. 31
Then, in September, 20 I 6, Jennifer was picked up in Massachusetts on an arrest
warrant. 32 At that time, she was engaged lo a manied man who had recently pled
"guilty in connection with a $175 million fraud scheme."J3 Jennifer later broke
off the engagement. 34 Child protective authorities retained custody of Sidney
upon Jennifer's arrest. 35
Jennifer has claimed that over the years she repeatedly tried to arrange
visits between Grandma Penny and Sydney, though this claim is controverted by
significant evidence. 36 Penny responded that the only attempt came in a text message in 201 l, right before Jennifer left for Florida, that stated, "Gone out of state.
You can come visit if you want to." 37 Penny only had a chance to talk with Sidney twice, and only on birthdays, with the conversations lasting only five
minutes. 38 After Penny's second conversation with Sidney, Jennifer's phone was
disconnected, and Grandma Penny could no longer contact Sidney. 39 During the
years that Sidney disappeared with her mother, Penny constantly worried about
Sidney's well-being. 40 Recently, Jennifer has maintained she would comply with
any visitation schedule. 41 But a Cass County, Illinois, judge was skeptical. 42 The
State of Illinois later urged that Jennifer neglected Sidney and that Sidney should
be placed for adoption. 43
After Jennifer's arrest in Massachusetts in 2016, Sidney was in the temporary custody of her paternal aunt and uncle due to an Illinois court ruling. 44
Yet because the court did not wish to take Sidney from Jennifer, it scheduled a

29
Rushton, Custody of Watkin:,, supra note 27. While Robert had a lawyer in Florida, there
was no cxpres~ indication given that Robert resided in Florida. See id.
30
David Blanchette, Judge in Watkins Case Keeps Foster Care Arrangement in Place, SJR
(March 21, 2017, 2:54 PM), http://www.sj-r,com/news/20170321/judge-in-watkins-case-kccpsfoster-care-arrangement-in-place.
31
Rushton, Faces o_f Watkins, supra note 4.
32
Otwell, supra note 7,
33
Rushton,.lennifer Watkins Fights, supra note 25.
34
Id.
35
Rushton, Girl ofMurdered Dad, supra note 26.
3G
See Rushton, Jennifer Watkins Fights, supra nole 25.
37
Id.
)8
Id.
39
Id.
40
id.
41
Id.
42
See id.
43
See id.
44

Id.
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review of the case on January 20, 2017, with grandparent visitation continuing. 45
As of August, 2017, Sidney remains in the custody of her paternal aunt and uncle,
with Jennifer continuing her court-ordered counselling with Sidney. 46 But the
judge was disappointed with Jennifer's progress in counselling and urged her to
take it more seriously. 47
Sidney has always been aware that she is the center of a childcare battle
between her paternal grnndmother and her mother. 48 Additionally, she is aware
of the legal problems facing her mother. 49 In spite of everything, Sidney, at nine,
has been doing well, has an IQ of 122, earns high marks and behaves well in
school. 50 In addition, it appears Sidney has made friends wherever she has
lived.~
While she <lid obtain a visitation order in 20 I 0, 52 Grandma Penny could
easily have been stymied by the inadequacies in the Illinois laws on grandparent
childcare, which, unfortunately, permeate grandparent childcare laws across the
country. Grandmas like Penny may not be as fortunate in the courts in their pursuits of continuing beneficial contacts with their grandchildren.
1

B. The legal Framework
In 2010, at the time of the first court order on grandparent visitation, one
Illinois law stated: "Grandparents, great-grandparents, and siblings of a minor
child, who is one year old or older, have standing to bring an action in circuit
court by petition, requesting visitation in accordance with this Section." 53 Additionally, grandparents, great-grandparents and siblings had "standing to file a petition for visitation and any electronic communication rights in a pending dissolution proceeding or any other proceeding that involves custody or visitation
issues .... " 54
Under the 2010 law, a grandparent and certain others could file a petition
for visitation if there had been "an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent,"55 and one of the following conditions existed: the child's other parent (i.e.,

45

See id.
Bruce Rushton, Sidney Watkins Srays Put, ILL. TIMES (Aug. 29, 20 l 7, 5:40 PM), illinoistimes.com/ article-19064-sid ley-watk.ins-stays-put.html.
41
Id.
48
Rushton, Jennifer Watkins Fights, supra note 25.
49
See id.
46

50
51

Id.

See generally id.

Id.
750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN 5/607 (a-3), repealed by P.A. 99-90, § 5-20, eff. Jan. l, 2016.
The same law had separate provisions on stepparent visitation. Id. § 51601 (b )( I.S)(A)--(B) (stating
a petition for visitation privileges may be met if the child is 12 and has resided with stepparent for
at least five years).
54
ld. § 5/607 (a-3 ).
55
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(1).
s2

53
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the one without custody) was deceased or missing for at least three months; 56 a
parent was incompetent; 57 a parent was incarcerated; 58 the parents were divorced
or involved in a court case involving custody or visitation of the child, where at
least one parent did not object to visitation; 59 the parents were unwed and not
1iving together, where the maternal grandparents (or others re lated to the mother)
were seeking visitation; 60 or the parents were unwed and not living together,
where the paternal grandparents (or others related to the father) were seeking
visitation, but only if paternity was established by court order. 61
Additionally, the 20 l O visitation law stated that "there is a rebuttable
presumption that a fit parent's actions and decisions regarding grandparent ...
visitation are not harmful to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health." 62
When deciding whether to grant visitation, a court was to consider the child's
preference; 63 the mental/physical health of the child; 64 the mental/physical health
of the visitation petitioner; 65 the length/quality of the relationship between the
visitation petitioner and the child; 66 the good faith of the person filing the pctition;67 the good faith of the person denying the visitation; 68 the quantity of the
visitation time requested; 69 whether the child resided with the visitation petitioner for at least six consecutive months; 70 whether the visitation petitioner had
frequent/regular contact with the child for at least twelve consecutive months; 71
any other fact that establishes that the end of the relationship with the petitioner
may hann the child's physical, mental, or emotional health; 72 and whether the
visitation petitioner was the primary caretaker of the child for at least six consecutive months. 73 The court could order visitation constituting "reasonable access
without requiring overnight or possessory visitation."74
In 2010, when the paternal grandparents were granted visitation, they
argued that under the statute, there was an unreasonable denial of visitation by

57
58

59
60

61

62
6J
64

65

66
67

68

69

70
71
72

13
74

Jd. § 5/607 (a-5)(1 )(A-5).
Id.§ 5/607 (a-S)(l)(A-10).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)( I )(A-15) (during the three-month period preceding the visitation request).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)( l )(8).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)( 1)(D).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(1 )(E).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(3).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(4)(A) (when the child is sufficiently mature to express such preference).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(4)(B).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(4)(C).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(4)(D).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(4)(E).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(4)(F).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(4)(G).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(4)(H).
Id. § 51607 (a-5)(4)(1).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(4)(J).
Id. § 5/607 {a-5)(4)(K).
Id. § 5/607 (a-5)(5).
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Jennifer. 75 At trial, Jermifor invoked her Fifth Amendment rights. 76 Two doctors
testified that Jennifer did not agree with the grandparents' lifestyle choices, believed that they were insincere about their desire for visitation, and believed they
lacked a close relationship with Sidney. 77 The same doctors opined that the
grandparents were competent and sincere about their visitation desires because
they consistently visited with Steven and Sidney when Steven was alive. 78 The
trial court deemed Jennifer's denial of visitation unreasonable. 79
After several years of debate, the Illinois legislature amended its marriage and marriage dissolution laws, effective 2016. These reforms included provisions on "visitation by certain non-parents. " 80 Yet the reforms, in our view,
still fail to address adequately childcare opportunities for third parties, including
grandparents. Under the new laws, grandparents (and certain others) 81 can only
pursue "visitation and electronic communication" with a child "who is one year
old or older" if there has been "an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent
that causes undue mental, physical, or emotional harm to the child." 82 Additionally, one of the following conditions must exist: a parent must be deceased or
missing for at least 90 days; 83 a parent must be incompetent 84 or incarcerated; 85
the parents must be divorced, legally separated,86 or involved in a court proceeding regarding "parental responsibilities or visitation issues regarding the child,"87
and at least one parent must not object to visitation; 88 or the parents must be
unwed. 89 In assessing grandparent visitation requests, there "is a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent's actions and decisions regarding grandparent ... visitation are not harmful to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health." 90
Further, courts must take into account the wishes of the child when deciding
whether to order nonparent visitation but are not expressly required to consider

15

Watkins v. Watkins, No. 4-10-0759, 201 I WL 10482574, at• 12 (llL App. Ct. Feb. 3,201 l);

see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/607 (a-5)(1 )(A-5), repealed by P.A. 99-90, § 5-20, eff Jan.

I, 2016 (requiring the visitation petitioner to show that there was "an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent" where the child's other parent was deceased).
76
Watkins, 2011 WL I 0482574, at "I 2.
77

1~

19

id.
See id. at *14.
id. at * I 3.

750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.9 (West 2017).
Id.§ 5/602.9 (c) ("great-grandparents, step-parents, and siblings").
82
Id.§ 5/602.9 (c)(l).
83
Id.§ 5/602.9 (c)(l)(A).
84
Td. § 5/602.9 (c)(l)(B).
85
Id. § 51602.9 (c)(l)(C) (for a period in excess of90 days "immediately before" visitation is
sought).
86
Id.§ 5/602.9(c)(l )(D).
87
Id.§ 5/602.9(b)(i).
88
id.
89
Id. § 5/602.9 (c)(J )(E) (where the parents "are not living together" and parentage "has been
established by a court of competent jurisdiction").
90
Id. § 5/602.9 (b)(4).
80
81
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the best interests of the child. 91 Under the new laws, there are also no opportunities for nonparents, like grandparents, to secure childcare opportunities by becoming parents in the absence of formal adoption, though varying new parentage
law proposals were considered. 92
Beyond nonparent visitation, under the 2016 laws, nonparents can seek
a judicial allocation of "parental responsibilities," defined as involving more
childcare than docs child visitation. 93 A "person other than a parent" can petition
for such an allocation if the child "is not in the physical custody of one of his or
her parents." 94 Further, a step-parent can petition, inter alia, where "the parent
having the majority of parenting time is deceased" or otherwise unable to care
for the child and "the child wishes to live with the step-parent."95 Where one
parent is deceased, the decedent's parent or step-parent can petition if, at the time
of the parent's death, the surviving parent "had been absent from the marital
abode for more than one month" without the decedent knowing the whereabouts; 96 the surviving parent was in "state or federal custody;"97 or the surviving
parent had been involved in domestic violence. 98 Clearly, Grandma Penny will
be ineligible to seek an allocation of parental responsibilities as long as Sidney
is in Jennifer's custody in Jllinois, 99 where they now reside.

91

Id. § 5/602.9 (b)(5).
See Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution: The Key Questions, 59 WAYNE L.
REV. 743, 753-56 (2013) [hereinafter Parness, Parentage Law].
93
Compare 750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/60 l.2(b)(3) (nonparent can seek an allocatio11), id.
§ 51602.5 (b) (allocation can include "significant decision-making responsibility for each significant issue affecting the child"), and id. § 5/602. 7(a) (allocation can include "parenting time"), with
id. § 5/602.9(a)(4) ("visitation" by non-parents means "in-person time spent between a child" and
a nonparcnt, which "may include electronic communication").
94
id. § 5/60 l .2 (b)(3 ).
95
Id.§ 5/601.2 (b)(4)(A), (C).
96
id. § 51601.2 (b)(5)(A).
97
Id. § 5/601.2 (b)(5)(8).
98
Id. § 5/601.2 (b)(5)(C).
99
Id. § 5/601.2 (b)(J). JcllJlifer's physical custody was absent, of course, while she was in jail
in Florida in 20 l l. At that time, the 2016 law was 1101 in effect, and even if it was, Sidney was not
in Illinois, so Illinois law could not apply. Additionally, notwithstanding Steven's death, Grandma
Penny could not seek such an allocation under ,mothf:r statutory section. Id. § 5/601 .2 (b)(5).
92

104
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III. A NEW MODEL NONl-'ARENTCHlLD CUSTODY AND VISJTATION ACT AND A
REVISED UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT

Restrictive provisions on childcare orders for grandparents in 1llinois
and elsewhere in the United States may soon change. The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recently established separate drafting
committees, one to establish a new ''Nonparental Child Custody and Visitation
Act" (NPCCV A), and the other to amend its 2002 Uniform Parentage Act
(RUPA).

A. The New NPCCVA
The NPCCVA, in October, 2016, was described as providing "procedures and factors for courts to apply when asked to grant custody or visitation to
non-parents." 100 The Comnussioners at that time recognized separate nonns for
who, as nonparents, may petition for custody 101 or for visitation. 102 As to custody,
nonparents who petition included those who "exercised [primary] care and control of a child" while making "decisions regarding the health, welfare and other
needs of the child [for a period of six or more months] during the year before the
filing of the petition." 103 They also included anyone who "has been a de facto
parent of the child during the year proceeding the filing of the petition," 104 defined as one who is not otherwise a legal parent; 105 who within the two years
immediately before filing undertook "permanent, unequivocal, committed parental responsibility in the child's life;" 106 and who so acted with the support of
"another parent of the child," where both "accepted" the developing relationship
and "behaved as though" the nonparent "[was] a parent of the child." 107

JOO
NON-PARENTAL CHILD CUSTO.DY AND VJSITATION Ac'f, Prefatory Note, 1 (UN1F. LAW
COMM 'N, Drafting Committee Meeting, October 2016) [hereinafter NPCCV A OCTOBER 2016
DRAFT]. Seemingly, such factors would comparably apply when nonparents petition for childcare
in a new case, or in a pending case, like a divorce case involving parents. See, e.g., Burak v. Burak,
No. 97, 20 I 7 Md. LEXIS 609 (Md. Aug. 29, 20 I 7).
101
NPCCVA OCTOBER 2016 DRAFT, supra note 100, § S. '"Custody' means physical custody,
legal custody, or both." Id. § 2(4).
102
Id. § 2(18). "'Visitation' means the right to spend time with a child, which may include
overnights."
103
Id. § S(a)(3}-(4).
104
Id. § S(a)(S).
10~
Id. § 2(5)(A). Fortunately, the confusing mix of de facto parentage with nonparent childcare
was removed in 2017. See. e.g., NON•PARENTAL CHILD CUSTODY VtSlTATION ACT §J 02(10) (UNIF.
LAW COMM'N, Annual Meeting Draft July 2017) [hereinafter NPCCVAJULY 2017 DRAFT] ("'nonparent' means an individual other than a parent"). Unfortunately, some American state laws on
nonpparent childcare do talk of "de facto" custody. See, e.g., A.A. v. B.B., 384 P.Jd 878, 882
(Haw. 2016)(citing HAW. REV. STAT.§ 57 l-46(a)(l}-(2) (West 2017).
106
NPCCVA 0CTORER 2016 DRAFT,supra note I 00, § 2(5)(8).
107
Id. § 2(5)(c)(iii).
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As to visitation, nonparents may petition under the 2016 proposal if they
"exercised primary care and control of a child and made decisions regarding the
health, welfare and other needs of the child for a period of six or more months
during the year preceding the filing of a petition;" 108 had "been a de facto parent
of the child during the year before the filing;" 109 and had "a substantial relationship" with the child where "denial [of] visitation ... would be a detriment to the
child." 110
The NPCCVA, as of July, 2017, defined nonparent as "an individual
other than a parent." 111 The Act applies to "a proceeding in which a nonparent
seeks custody or visitation over the objection of a parent," 112 eliminating the earlier separation of custody and visitation standing. Such a proceeding could be
pursued via a petition by a nonparent who is shown by "clear and convincing
evidence" to have "acted as a consistent caretaker of the child without expectation of financial compensation" 113 and who "has resided with the child," 114 where
there was explicit or tacit acceptance by "a parent" of the child of the developmeut of a "bonded and dependent relationship between the child and the nonparent,"115 as well as a showing of the child's best interests. 116 Alternatively, a
petition's grant could be founded on "clear and convincing evidence" of a "substantial relationship" between nonparent and child, where "denial of custody or
visitation would result in a [detriment] to the child" 117 and where a grant of custody or visitation would be "in the best interests of the child." 118

B. Amendments to the 2002 RUPA
The RUPA, in October, 2016, had both a Draft and an Alternative B
Draft. Each spoke to parentage without assisted reproduction, with assisted reproduction but no surrogate, and with assisted reproduction with a surrogate. Of
course, should a grandparent qualify as a parent, the grandparent may not need
to rely on any nonparent childcare laws to secure grandchild childcare. 119

108

Id. § 5(b)(l).
Id. § 5(b)(2).
ld. § 5(b)(3).
111
N PCCVA JULY 2017 DRAFT, supra note 105, § 102 (I 0).
112
Id. § I 03(a).
113
Id. § l 12(a)(l ).
114
ld. § I 12(a){l)(A) (stating a nonparent must have lived with the child for at least six consecutive months or ~ince birth).
115
Id. § 1 I 2 (a)(l )(8).
116
Id.§ 112 (a)(l)(C).
117
Id, § l 12 (a)(2). The term "harm., is suggeste<l as an alternative to "detriment." See id.
§ ll2(b).
118
Id. § 112 (a)(2).
119
Where a grandparent otherwise qualifies as a parent but where there are already two continuing childcare parents and where three parents are not authorized, such a grandparent may only be
able to seek childcare as a nonparent.
10~
110
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As to children born of sex, under the RUPA October 2016 Draft there
could be a presumed parent (and thus is not a nonparent as in the NPCCVA) who,
inter alia, "(i) resided with the child for a significant period of time; (_ii) engaged
in consistent caretaking of the child; (iii) accepted full and pem1anent responsibilities as a parent;" and (iv) "established a bonded and dependent relationship
with the child, and the other parent understood, acknowledged, or accepted format ion of that relationship or behaved as though the individual is a parent of the
child. 120 A presumed parent also included one who "for the first two years of the
child's life ... resided in the same household with the child and openly held out
the chi Id as the individual's own child." 121
Under the RUP A Alternate B Draft in 2016, there could be a "de facto parent,"
though he or she is not a presumed parent (and also is not a nonparent as in the
NPCCVA). 122 Here, a de facto parent would be "an individual who fully and
completely undertook an unequivocal, committed and responsible parental role
in the child's life during the child's minority." 123 Such de facto parentage required a determination in line with the 2017 RUPA Draft's recognition of a
presumed parent where same residency in the first two years was not re-

quired.124

The RUPA, as of March, 2017, moved the presumed parentage without
the first two-year requirement into a separate de facto parent section which
prompts no presumption. 125 But it maintained "presumed" parentage for residing
with the child "for the first two years of the child's life." 126 As of July, 2017, this
presumption continued, 127 but the July 2017 de facto parent section in RUPA,
still prompting no presumption, differed a bit from the earlier section. 12s
Grandma Penny seemingly would have difficulty in her quest for visitation with Sydney under the varying proposed models on parentage and nonparent

120
REV. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 204(a)(6) (UNTF. LAW COMM'N, Draft Committee Meeting
Oct 2016). Such parentage continued in the REV. UNJf. PARENTAGE ACT § 205(a) (UNIF. LAW
COMM'N, Committee Meeting Draft Mar. 2017) [hereinafter RUPA DRAFT MAR. 2017] ("de facto"
parent is not a "presumed parent" under this draft); see also id. §205(a)(6) ("bonded and dependent
relationship with the child was fostered or supported by another parent of the child").
121
REV. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N, Committee Meeting Draft
O(.;t. 2016). This continued in REV. UNJF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 204(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N, Meeting July 2017) [hereinafter RUPA MEETING JULY 2017].
122
REV. UNJF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 102(6) (UNlF. LAW COMM'N, Drafting Committee Meeting,
Redline Draft-Alternative B, Oct. 2016) [hereinafter ALTERNATJVE B].
121
Id. § 205(a).
124
Id. (including de facto parentage with no presumption); see also RUPA MEETING JULY 2017,
supra note 121, § 609(d).
12j
RUPA DRAFT MAR. 2017, supra note 120.
126
Id. § 204(a)(2).
127
REV. UNJF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 204(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N, Annual Meeting Draft July
I 9, 2017) [hereinafter RUPA JULY ! 9 DRAIT], http://www.unifonn!aws.org/shared/docs/parentagc/2017AM_Parentage_AsApproved.pdf.
128
Id. § 609(d) (requiring, per§ 609(d)(5), "a bonded and dependent relatiomhip with the child
that is parental in nanire").
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childcare to date. Other grandmas might not be as lucky as Penny and might find
an unsympathetic cou1t.
IV. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON ANY NON PARENT Cl-lll .DCARE AND
CHILD CONTACT ORDERS OVER PARENTAL O8JECTJONS

While we believe new laws are needed to better serve the interests of
grandparents and their grandchildren regarding familial contacts, there are some
limits to any new Jaws. In Troxel v. Granville, 129 four United States Supreme
Court justices determined in a plurality opinion that the liberty interest of "parents in the care, custody, and control of their children" uo (hereinafter childcare
interests) generally foreclose states from compelling requested grandparent
childcare over current parental objections. 131 Yet, these four justices recognized
that special factors might justify judicial interference in parental decision-making as long as the contrary contemporary wishes of parents were accorded "at
least some special weight."m The plurality, and one concurring justice, reserved
the question of whether any non parental visitation, which may not only include
grandparents, but also stepparents, siblings and others, 133 must "include a showing of harm or potential harm to the ch.ild as a condition precedent." 134 Yet in
concurring, Justice Souter hinted that at least some nonparental visitation could
129

530 U.S. 57 (2000).

Id. at 65 (plurality opinion) (calling tl1e interest "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.").
131
Id. al 68--69 (plurality opinion) (explaining that "so long as a parent adequately cares for his
or her children [i.e., is flt], there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent's children"); see generai/y Donald Leo Bach, The Rapanos
Rap: Grappling with Plurality Decisions, U.S. L. WEEK, (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://www.dewittross.com/docs/publications/bach-articl e-lw-oct-2-20 I 2.pdf?sfvrsn=O ( ana1yzno

ing plurality opinions).
132
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion) ("[I]f a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue
here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the
parent's own determination.").
133
See. e.g.,ln re Marriage ofJamcs & Claudine W., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461,464 (Ca!. Ct. App. 2
Dist. 2003) (applying Troxel to stepparent visitation request).
134
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 (plurality opinion) ("we do not consider .. _whether the Due Process
Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm
to the child as a condition precedent to granting [nonparent] visitation.") (Souter, J, concurring).
But see McGarity v. Jcrrolds, 429 S.W.3d 562, 570-71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (establishing harm
where it is requin:d). See generally PRJNCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DJSSOLUTION: ANALYS!S
AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 2.18(2)(a)(i) (AM. LAW fKST. 2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF FAMfLY
DrssoLUTJON] (suggesting that harm is not always needed to support court orders for childcare
n::sponsihility and that "a grandparent or other relative who has developed a significant relationship
with the child" can seek childcare where "the parent objecting to the allocation has not been performing a reasonable share of parenting fum:tions for the child"); Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law
Regarding the Rights ofThird Parties to Seek Visitation and Custody ofChildren, 47 FAM. L.Q. I,
apps at 18-34 (201 J) (comparing state grandparent and other third party visitation statutes that do
not explicitly require the loss of a relationship with a tb ird party to cause harm).
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be based solely on a preexisting "substantial relationship" between a child and a
nonparent together with "the State's paiticular best interests standard." 135
Several Justices dissented in Troxel. Justice Kennedy, in dissent, not unlike Justice Souter, observed that a best interests standard might be constitutional
where the nonparent acted "in a caregiving role over a significant period of
time," 136 hinting that such a nonparent might sometimes even be afforded ''de
facto" p arent status. 137 Also in dissent, Justice Scalia seemingly agreed, noting
the need for both "gradations" of nonparents 138 and carefully crafted state law
definitions of parents. 139 A third dissenter, Justice Stevens, added that because at
least some children in nonparent settings likely "have fundamental liberty interests" in "preserving established familial or family-like bonds," 140 nonparents
seeking childcare must be distinguished by whether there is a ''presence or absence of some embodiment of family." 14 1
135

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring) (analyzing the Washington statute and
acknowledging that while not every nonparcnt should he capable of securing visitation upon
demonstrating a child's best interests, perhaps a nonparent who establishes "that he or she has a
substantial relationship with the child" should be 11ble to petition if the state chooses). An exemplary statute is VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(8) (West 2017), which states, "The court shall give due
regard to the primacy of the parent-child relationship but may upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the child would be served thereby award custody or visitation to any other person with a legitimate interest." An illustrative case is In re M. W:, 292 P.3d
1158 (Colo. App. 201 2) (employing COLO. Rr-.v. STAT. ANN.§ 14-10-123 (West 2017)).
ll 6
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Cases arc sure to arise ... in which a third
party, by acting in a caregiving role over a significant period of time, has developed a relationship
with a child which is not necessarily subject to absolute parental veto .... In the design and elaboration of their visitation laws, States may be entitled to consider that certain relationships are such
that to avoid the risk of hann, a best interests standard can be employed by their domestic relations
courts in some circumstances.") id. at 98-99.
m
Id. at I 00--0 1 ("[A) fit parent's right vis-a-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right visa-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another.").
138
Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Judicial vindication of'parental rights' ... requin:s .. .
judicially defined gradations of other persons (grandparents, extenderl fami ly, adoptive family in
an adoption later found lo be invalid, long-term guardians, etc.) who may have some claim against
the wishes of the parents.").
139
Id. ("Judicial vindication of 'parental rights' .. . requires ... a judicially crafted definition
of parents.").
140
Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. I 10, 130 (1989)
(stating that the Court has not "had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship"); In re Meridian H., 798
N .W.2d 96, 108 (Neb. 201 I) (recognizing no federal or state constitutional right to continuing
sibling relationships w ith a sister upon the termination ofparental rights regarding the sister, where
the sister was placed in foster care and the two older siblings were adopted). See generally Jill
E laine Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 V AND. L. REV. 897, 931 (2012) (urging courts, legislatures, and
scholars to pay belier attention to ''sibling relationships," concluding that "[t]amily law' s narrow
focus on marriage and parenthood, inherited from the common law and then endlessly replicated
without nonnative scrutiny, has constrained critical lhinking in family law for too long.").
141
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The New York high court utilized this observation to suggest that children's interests might also prompt broader definitions of parentage.
Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 499-500 (N.Y. 2016); see also In re Clifford K.,
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Thus, while important, current parental objections to nonparent childcare
desires need not always be disposilive. 142 Since Troxel, the United States Supreme Court has not spoken about nonparent childcare over current parental objections. Jt has nol addressed the special weight, special factors, harn1 or potential
harm, de facto parenthood, children's fundamental liberty interests, or familylike bonds. 143 Following Troxel, many state legislatures have refined their third
party childcare laws, 144 including crafting new, or recrafting special, grandparent
childcare starutes. 145 State high courts have heard challenges to nonparcnt childcare laws since Troxel. 146 State legislators and judges have differed interstate
when examining the harm or potential harm, special factors and special weight
that can justify judicial interference with parental liberty interests via court orders on third party childcare over current parental objections. 147 As the United

2 J7 W. Va, 625, 646 (2005) (reiterating, without reference to Troxel, that a child has rights "of a
constitutional magnitude" regarding "continued association" with those with whom there are close
emotional bonds).
142
Comparably, one parent's objection to placement for adoption is not always disposilive
when the other parent agrees and placement clearly and convincingly serves the child's best interests. See, e.g., in re C.L.O., 41 A3d 502,504 (D.C. 2012). Further, the Court may issue a court
order waiving the other parent's required consent in the child's best interest. Id.
143
One distinguished commentator said the following about Troxel:

Troxel did more to confuse than clarify the law in the area of grandparents'
rights Jaws. On lhe one hand, the case can be read broadly as reaffirming that
parents have a fondamental right to control the upbringing of their children
and as providing a basis for invalidating orders for grandparent visitation over
the objection of fit parents. On the other hand, Troxel can be read as a very
narrow decision that involved a particularly broad law applied in a situation
where the parent was fit and regular grandparent visitation still occurred. The
absence of a majority opinion makes it even more difficult to assess the impact
of the decision other than the certainty that it will lead to challenges to grandparents' rights law throughout the country.
833 (4th ed. 2011).
For a review of general third party childcare statutes, see Atkinson, supra note 134.
145
Robyn L. Ginsberg, Grandparents' Visitation Rights: The Constitutionalily ofNew York's
Domestic Relations Law Section 72 Afler Troxel v. Granville, 65 ALB. L. REV. 205,205 n.2 (2001)
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
144

(listing grandparent visiuition statutes).
146
See generally Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution/or State Courts
and Legislatures, 69 LA. L. REv. 927,940 n.100 (2009) (providing a review of post-Troxel state
cases on the constitutionality of such statutes); Solange! Maldonado, When Fa/her (or Mother)
Doesn't Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L.
R.Ev. 865, 867 n.5 (2003) (providing an earlier review of such statutes). More recent grandparent
childcare cases include Mat1erofCr..1stodyofL.M.S., 387 P.3d 707 (Wash. 2017) and D.P. v. G.JP.,
146 A.3d 204 (Pa. 2016).
147
See Atkinson, supra note 134 (demonstrating variations in, inter a\ia, laws on great-grandparents, burden of proof, and necessity to show harm), Interstate variations also appear for state
law definitions of parents and for state laws on stepparent visilations. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness,
Survey of Jllinois Law: Stepparent Childcare, 38 S. ILL. U, L.J. 575, 588-89 (2014) (providing a
survey of 11linois stepparent childcare law); Parness, Parentage law, supra note 92, at 753-63
(providing an analysis of American parentage Jaw).
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States Supreme Cou1t has recognized, the regulati on of domestic relations laws
on childcare standing rests within the virtually exclusive province of the states, 14 g
so that interstate variations may arise even where there are model laws, Ii.kc those
now proposed by the NCCUSL.
Since Troxel, there has been an upsurge in primary or significant childcare by grandparents, as well as by other nonparents, including the intimate partners (male or female) of single parents who cohabitate, when: the single parents
are often unwed birth mothers. 149 As a result, there continue to be many third-

See, e.g., Parness, Federal Consticulional Childcare, supra note I, al 994-1002 (descrihing
and c riticizing this approach). But see Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND.
L.J. 787, 798--815 (2015) (describing lhe long history of some federal family status determinations). Of cour~t\ the states may provide greater protections of parental rights than are afforded by
the federal constitution. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hunter, 771 N. W.2d 694, 711 (Mich. 2009) ("No1hing
in Troxel can be interpreted as precluding states froro offering greater protection to the fundamental parenting rights of natural parents, regardless of whether the natural parents are fit. This rule
applies here.").
149
See, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage Became Optional: Cohabitation, Gender, and
the Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 52 1, 523 (20 11) (noting increasing
parenting by single parents and relatives); Stephanie J. Ventura & Christine A. Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1940-99, NAT. VITAL STAT. REP., l, 2 (Oct 18. 2000),
https;//www.cdc.gov/nchs/<lata/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48_l 6.pdf ("The percent of births to unmarried
women rose almost without interruption from 1940 (3 .8 percent) to 1994 (32.6 percent) .. . From
1994 to 1999 there was little change ... it was 33 .0 percent in 1999."); Lynn D. Wardle, Dilemmas
ofIndissoluble Parenthood: Legal Incentives, Parenting, and the Work-Family Balance, 26 BYU
J. PUB. L. 265, 270-71 (20 12) (increasing parenting by unwed couples and by single parents,
mostly mothers); Facts About Children Being Raised by Grandparents, ILL. DEP'T ON AGrNG,
http://www.illinois.gov/aging/communityscrvices/caregiver/pages/grg_facts.aspx (last visited
Oct. 3, 2017) (listing more than 200,000 children under the uge o f 18 as living in grandparent
headed households, with more than 40,000 grandparents "responsible for their grandchildren for 5
years or more"); Rose M. Kreider & Renee Ellis, Living Arrarrgements of Childre,1: 2009, U.S.
CENSUS B URE.Au 2, 4 (June 2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/201 I pubs/p70-126.pdf(providing
illustrations, including Figure 1, illustrating the historical living arrangemenls of children from
1880-2009, and Table 1, displaying selected 199 J- 2009 figures, showing more and more children
not living with two married parents and living with a single parent or grandparents only).
148

Increasing instances of parenting by grandparents, and other relatives, seemingly arises, in part,

because of the Federal Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008.
42 U.S.C. § 67 1(a)(29) (2012) (requiring the stale, within 30 days ofrcmoval of child ftom parental
custody, to exercise "due diligence to identify and provide notice tu ... all adult grandparents" au<l
other relatives and explain options involving kinship guardianship). See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78A-6-307(7), (9), (J8)(c)-(e) (West 2017) (when a child is removed from parental custody, preference for placement of the child shall be given to "a relative of the child''); Judith T. Younger,
Families Now: What We Don't Know Is Hurting Us, 40 HOFSTRA L. R EV. 719,722,733 (2012)
("glaring need for reliable data" on "what is really happening in intimate relationships"). Th~ rising
amount of unwed cohabiting couples has also prompted much litigation over property distribution,
as well as future childcare, upon separation. See, e.g., In re Kelly & Moesslang, 287 P.3d 12 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2012) (applying equitable "committed intimate relationship" doctrine to unwed separating
couple who lived "in a marital-like relationship and acquired what would have been community
r,roperty had there been a marriage"). To the extent these disputes involve contracts, there may be
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party childcare disputes in the state courts, as well as disputes over new fonns of
parentage. While court-compelled nonparent childcare, over cunent parental objections, 150 can arise either from third party standing or from a type of newlyrecognized parental status, sometimes third party standing is the only available
avenue for nonparents because de facto parenthood often cannot be employed
where two legal parents already exist. 151
New de facto parent statutes and cases present a scheme for approaching
grandparent (and other nonparent) childcare that does not envision a singular approach to judicial assessments of the special weight to be accorded current parent
wishes or of the harm or potential harm to children. 152 De facto parentage laws
increasingly recognize that a single parent's current objection to a new second
parent carries less weight when the single parent explicitly consented to and
strongly fostered a substantial parent-like relationship between his or her child
and the aspiring second parent. 153 Comparably, grandparent childcare orderscontrolling statutes. See, e.g., Cavalli v. Arena, 42 A.3d 250 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.2012) (holding thal a claim is barred by a recent amendment N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25: l-5(h) (West 2017) which
requires palimony pacts to be in writing and subject to independent attorney review and advice).
10
Overcoming parental objections to third party or new de facto parent childcare can often be
~
more difficult when custodial (as opposed to non-custodial) parents object. See, e.g., David D.
Meyer, The Custodial Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1461, 1466 (2006)
("[T]he Constitution does in fact tolerate unequal roles for parents in the divided family" where
"the weakness - of non-custodial parents' rights" does not "re.fleet the unique disabilities of the
non-custodial parent," but serves to make "room for sensitive accommodatioo by the state of the
potentially conflicting inkrests of various family members.").
151
While most American states do not recognize the possibility of three (or more) parents for
any child, a few do. See, e.g., CAJ.. FAM. CODE§ 7612(c) (West 2017) (no need to choose between
two presumed parents, like a husband of the birth mother and one who holds himself or herself out
as a parent, when making a choice "would be detrimental to the child"); T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.
2d 873, 876 (La. 1999) (holding "dual paternity" possible in both husband and biological father
where husband's marriage to birth mother had been dissolved and where child's best interests
would be served); Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854 (La. 1989) (holding that two men may have
paternal rights in a child, as well as child support obligations). Three parents have also been recognized as possible in New Jersey where a birth parent's earlier consent to a stepparent's performance of parental duties has led the stepparent to possibly be a psychological parent, even though
a second parent, here a formal adoptive parent, may not have consented to such duties. K.A.F. v.
D.L.M., 96 A.3d 975, 981 (N .J. Super. App. Div. 2014) (requiring stepparent to show "exceptional
circwnslances" and the child's best interests to gain a court-ordered childcare order over the birth
parent's current objection). On the need for emergence of a three- (or more-) parent family, sec,
for example, Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (2008).
152
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Meister, 876 N.W.2d 746 (Wis. 2016).
153
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (c) (West 2017) (de facto parent with "support and
consent of the child's parent or parents who fostered ... a parent-like relationship"); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-831.01 (I )(A) (West 2017) (de facto parent who has "[l]ived with the child in the same
household at the time of the child's birth or adoption by the child's parent," who has "taken on full
and permanent responsibilities as th~ child's parent," and who has "held himself or herself out as
the child's parent with the agreement of the child's parent or, if there are 2 parents, both parents").
This approach is suggested in draft revisions to the Revised Uniform Parentage Act. REY. UNJF.
PARENTAGE ACT§ 205(a) (UN!f. LAW COMM'N, Style Committee Meeting Draft, Mar. 2017) and
RUPA JULY 19 DRAFT, supra note 127. § 609(d)(6) ("another parent" supported "the bonded and
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without second parent status-should also sometimes be founded on less weight
than current parental preferences where there was an objecting parent's earlier
acquiescence in a diminishment of superior parental authority. 154
V. CURRENT GRANDPARENT AND OTHER THIRD PARTY CHILDCARE LAWS
Third party childcare laws allow certain nonparents to pursue court-ordered childcare over current parental objections, be there one or two or more
legal parents. Often such nonparents must have developed bonded, dependent,
and perhaps parental-like, relationships with children which courts determine
must continue in the children's best interests. At times, third parties seeking
childcare over current parental objections need not demonstrate parental unfitness or extraordinary circumstances. 155 Varying third party childcare laws are
now illustrated, after a brief review of the challenges presented by the tenninology.

A. Terminology
Understanding the common terminology employed in American state
childcare laws, whether via statutes or precedents, is challenging. There are interstate, and sometimes even intrastate, variations in terms. The same statutory
term can have different meanings between states. Different courts will also employ ditlerent tenns in similar common law settings, which may-but need notfollow the statutory terms used elsewhere and which may have different meanings interstate.
As noted, Justice Kennedy in Troxel hinted that American states might
be able to afford "de facto" parent status to then-nonparents who acted "in a
caregiving role over a significant period of time." 156 Such status, in fact, is now
recognized in several states, though, at times, a differing term is employed, like

dependent relationship" that is required), htqi://www.unifonnlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/2017AM_Parentage_AsApproved. pdf
154
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Meister, 876 N,W.2d 746, 760 (Wis. 2016) (concluding that a
grandparent "need not prove a parent-child relationship in order to secure visitation rights"). It is
a far more difficult case where only one of two existing parents earlier acquiesced in diminished
parental authority. See, e.g., KA.F., 96 A.3d at 983 (holding that stepparent of minor child, a former domestic partner of biological mother, may have childcare standing due to earlier birth
mother's consent although no such consent by adoptive parent of child).
155
See, e.g., Weldon v. Ballow, 200 So. 3d 654,673 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (Pittman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (findings of parental unfitness or hann to child not always
needed to support a grandparent visitation order over parental objections); Janice M. v. Margaret
K., 948 A.2d 73 (Md. 2008); In re R.A., 891 A.2d 564 (N.H. 2005) (determining, per three of five
justices, that a finding of parental unfitness is unnecessary for grandparent childcare order).
156
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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presumed parent, equitable adoption partnt, or parent by estoppeL 157 Additionally, the requisites for such childcare parentage can be more particular (e.g., a
rrunimum time period for caregiving) or less particular (e.g., residence in the
household and providing some financial support). 158
Parental childcare status, whatever the tenn employed (herein "de facto
parenthood") is generally similar across state lines. While it can arise from some
pre-birth acts, chiefly it arises from post-birth acts that occur at no precise point
in time, for instance, with caregiving over a significant period of time. Imprecise
childcare parentage is thus distinguished from childcare parentage arising from
giving birth, a state-recognized voluntary parentage acknowledgement, a staterecognized adoption, a birth certificate registration, or a court judgment. 159
Beyond parental childcare, there are nonparental childcare opportunities.
Again, there are significant interstate differences in terminology and requisites.
A "de facto parent" might sometimes even be deemed a nonparent for childcare
purposes, as it was at one time in the NPCCVA. 160

B. Illustrative Grandparent and Other Third Party Childcare Laws
Some current third party childcare laws are quite broad, encompassing
many who help raise children. 161 Others are more narrow and address only grandparents or stepparents. 162 Sometimes, nonparents with standing to seek childcare

157

See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Challenges in Handling Imprecise Parentage Matters, 28 J.
AM. ACAO. MATRIM. L. 139, 142-44 (2015) [hereinafter Pame~s, Challenges].
158
Compare UNJF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 4(a)(4) (UNI!'. LAW CoMM'N 1973) (a man is ''presumed
to be the natural father of a child if ... while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child"), with UNrl'. PARENTAGE
ACT§ 204(a)(5) (UN!F. LAW COMM'N 2002) (a man is "presumed to be the father of a child if ...
for the first two years of the child's life, he resided in the same household with the child and openly
held out the child as his own"). The original 1973 Uniform Parentage Act is substantially followed
in CAL. FAM. CODE§ 761 l(d) (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-105(l)(d) (2017); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-IOS(d) (2017); and NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9: I 7-43{a)(4) (West 2017). The 2002
Uniform Pan:ntage Act is substantially followed in DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(a)(5) (2017);
N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-20-lO(l)(e) (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 40-11A-204(a)(5) (2017); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-204(A)(5) (2017); Tex. f AM. CODE A'JN. § l 60.204(a)(5) (West 20 l 7); and
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ l4-2-504(a)(v) (2017).
159
Parness, Challenges, supra note 157, at 142-44.
160
NONPARENTAL CHJLD CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT§ 2(5) (UNrF. LAW. COM\4'N., Committee Meeting Draft Oct. 2016). There can be a bit of confusion even when tenninology is not as
problematic. See, e.g.·, D,C. CODE§ 16-831.01(1), (5) (West 2017) (defining "de facto parent" in a
chapter on third party custody where third parties do not include parents or de facto parents); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 403.270 (West 2017) (stating that a "de facto" custodian, not a parent, can seek
court-ordered childcare).
161
See, e.g., D_C. CODE§ 16-831.0l(a)(l) (West 2017) ("A third party may file a complaint for
custody of a child"). However, the third party cannot be "the child's parent or de facto parent." Id.
§ 16-831.01(5).
162
Judicially, there is no opportunity for standing when statutes limit third party standing to
certain individuals, like grandparents or stepparents, as via parens patriae. See, e.g., In re Willeke,
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orders are described as having undertaken parental or parental-like duties, though
legal parentage is not prompted. 163
For broader nonparent childcare, consider a South Dakota statute which
allows "any person other than the parent of a child to intervene or petition a
court ... for custody or visitation of any child with whom he or she has served
as a primary caretaker, has closely bonded as a parental figure, or has otherwise
formed a significant and substantial relationship." 164 In South Dakota, a parent's
"presumptive right to custody" can be diminished by a third party childcare order
when there is abandonment or persistent parental neglect, forfeiture or surrender
of parental rights to a non parent, abdication of "parental rights and responsibilities," or "extraordinary circumstances" where there will likely be "serious detriment to the child." 165 In Kentucky, a "de facto custodian" of a child can seek
childcare if he or she was "the primary caregiver" and "financial supporter," rew
sided with the child for at least six months, and the child is under three. 166 In
Colorado, there is nonparent childcare standing to seek an allocation of parental
responsibilities when the nonparent "has had the physical care of a child for a
period of one hundred eighty-two days or more." 167 In New Mexico, when "neither parent is able ... to provide appropriate care," a child may be "raised
160 A.3d 688, 691 (N.H. 2017) (holding the common Jaw authority was abrogated by limited statutes, "although no express tenns to that effect are used").
163
A review of American state third party childcare laws c:in be found in Atkinson, supra note
134, app. See also Ferrand v. Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909, 919--37 (La. Ct. App. 20l6) (third party
review of visitation laws in 12 southern states).
164
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29 (2017). Thus, not all de facto parents can qualify as de facto
custodians with standing to seek childcare orders. See, e.g., Truman v. Lillard, 404 S.W.3d 863,
869 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that former same-sex partner of woman who adopted herniece
was not a de facto custodian and failed to show a waiver of superior parental right to custody).
165
S.D. Cootl'J£D LAWS§ 25-5-29(1)-{4) (2017). The statute has been applied to pennit visitation favoring a man with no biological or adoptive ties. Clough v. Nez, 759 N.W.2d 297 (S.D.
2008); see also S.D. COOIFIED LAWS§ 25-5-33 (2017) (parent can be ordered to pay child support
to nonparent having "custodial rights").
166
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West 2017) (requiring residence for at least one year ifthe
child is three or older). Thus, not all de facto parents can qualify as de facto custodians with standing to seek childcare. See, e.g., Truman, 404 S.W.3d at 869 (holding that fonner same-sex partner
of woman who adopted her niece was not a de facto custodian and failed to show a waiver of
superior parental right to custody); Spreacker v. Vaughn, 397 S.W.3d 419,422 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012)
(holding that paternal great-awJt is de facto custodian). There are similar laws in Indiana, e.g.,
Indiana, K.S. v. B.W., 954 N.E.2d 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (employing IND. CooE ANN.§ 31-92-35.5 (West 2017)); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 257c.03 (West 2017), South Carolina, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 63-15-60 (2017); and Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 32-1703 (2017). The phrase "de facto
custodian," and similar phrases, can also be used in other settings. See, e.g., In re Jesse C.,
C069325, 2012 WL 5902301 (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 26, 2012) (holding that de facto parent is one
who cares for child during dependency proceeding and de facto parent status is lost when dependency is tenninated); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-204(d) (2017) {defining "de facto guardian" in probate code); HA w. R.Ev. STAT. § 57 l-46(a)(2) {20 l 7) (stating that ''persons other than the
father or mother" may obtain child custody if they had "de facto custody").
167
COLO. RF.v. STAT.§ 14-10-123(l)(c) (2012); see. e.g., In re B.B.0., 277 P.3d 818 (Colo.
2012) (holding that the half-sister had standing); /11 re D.T., 292 P.3d 1120, 1121 (Col. App. 2012)
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by ... kinship caregivers," including an adult with a significant bond to the child
who cares for the child in a manner "consistent with the duties and responsibilities of a parent." 168 And in Wisconsin, a person who "has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the child" may secure "reasonable
visitation [rights] ... 'if, [first, the person has] 'maintained a relationship ...
with the child, [second,'] 'the child's parents have notice of the hearing,"' and
[third,] "the com1 dctcnnines [that] visitation is in the child's best interest." 169
Besides statutes, there is case precedent. For example, in Ohio there can
be no "shared parenting" contracts between parents and nonparents. 170 There, "a
parent may voluntarily share with a nonparent the care, custody, and control of
his or her child through a valid shared-custody agreement," which may create for
a nonparent "an agreement for permanent shared legal custody of the parent's
child" or an agreement for temporary shared legal custody, as when the agreement is revocable by the parent. 171 In Minnesota, under certain conditions, there
is a common law right to child visitation over parental objection for a former
family member, like an aunt who stood "in loco parentis" with the child. 172
Now, look at some examples of special nonparent childcare laws. 173 A
grandparent in New York has standing to seek visitation with a grandchild over
parental objection when "conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene."174 In Alabama, a grandparent, regardless of biologically ties, can obtain

(holding that the mother's friend did not have standing as she "served more of a grandmotherly
role, rather than a parental role" and mother never ceded her parental rights).
16
a
Stanley J. v. C!iffL., 319 P.3d 662, 664-65 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (applying N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-1 OB-3(A), (C) (West 2017)).
169
Vanderheiden v. Vanderheiden, No.2011AP2672, 2013 WL 5311475, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App.
Sept. 24, 2013).
170
In ,·e Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 24 l, 247 (Ohio 2002) (declining to extend the narrow class of
persons who are defined as parents for the purposes of entering a shared parenting agreement).
171
In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 305, 306, 308 (Ohio 2011). Custody by a nonparent is only
allowed under an agreement when the Juvenile Court deems the nonparent suitable and the shared
custody is in lhe best interests of the child. Bonfield, 780 N.E,2d at 245; see also in re LaPiana,
Nos. 93691, 93692, 2010 WL 3042394, •10 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2010) (granting a former
lesbian partner visitation with two children born of assisted reproduction where there wa~ a written
agreement to raise jointly the first child and other evidence of intent to share custody of both children).
172
Rohmiller v. Hart, 81 I N.W.2d 585,593 (Minn. 2012) ("[U]nder the common law in Minnesota, a finding of in loco parentis status has been essential to the granting of visitation to nonparcn ts over the objection of a fit parent."). At times, attaining "in loco parentis" status seemingly
elevates nonparent to parental status, See, e.g., Daniel v. Spivey, 386 S. W.3d 424, 429 (Ark. 2012)
(describing skpparent and same sex partner of parent as precedents).
173
Beside special childcare Jaws, there can also be other special laws addressing nonparcnts.
See, e.g., S.D. CODJFI.ED LAWS§ 25•7-8 (2017) ("A stepparent shall maintain his spouse's children
born prior to their marriage and is responsible as a parent for their support and education suitable
to his circumstances, but such responsibility shall not absolve the natural or adoptive parents of the
children from any obligation of support.").
171
Van Nostrand v. Van Nostrand, 925 N.Y.S.2d229, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 20ll)(citing N.Y.
DOM. REL LAW§ 72( I) (McKinney 2004); see also In re Victoria C., 56 A.3d 338 (Md. Ct. Spec.
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court-ordered visitation with a grandchild when the marriage of the child's parents is dissolving or has been dissolved, one or both parents are dead, or the child
was born out of wedlock. 175 When the grandchild is adopted intra-family, postadoption visitation rights only arise for "natural grandparents." 176 In Alaska, visitation can be sought by a grandparent who "has established or attempted to establish ongoing personal contact" with the grandchild. 177 In Arkansas, a grandparent has standing to seek visitation if the "marital relationship between the
parents ... has been severed by death, divorce, or legal separation." 178 In Georgia, a grandparent, or any family member, can obtain visitation if the court finds
"the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless visitation is granted"
and the child's best interests would be served. 179 In North Dakota, it is pennitted
by statute that "[t]he grandparents ... of an unmarried minor child may be
granted reasonable visitation rights to the child ... upon a finding that visitation
would be in the best interests of the child and would not interfere with the parentchild relationship." 180 And in Wisconsin, "the special grandparent visitation provision" only applies to "a nonmarital child whose parents have not subsequently
married. " 181
Sometimes states have statutes specifically relating to stepparents. As to
stepparents, in a Tennessee divorce,

App. 2012) (holding that sibling visitations can be ordered over parental objections only when
same standards for grandparent visits have been met).
m
ALA. CODE§ 30-3-4.2(a)(l), (b) (2017).
176
ALA. CODE§ 26-lOA-30 (2017); see also WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 20-7-1 Ol(c) (2017)(allowing
no visitation for biologically-tied grandparent where minor child is adopted and "neither adopting
parent is related by blood to the child"); Ex parte D.W., 835 So. 2d 186, 191 (Ala. 2002) (ruling
similarly on Alabama statute); Hcde v. Gilstrap, 107 P .3d 158, 175 (Wyo. 2005) (ruling that Wyoming statute does not infringe upon "constitutionally protected liberty interests" ofbiologicallytied grandparents).
177
ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.065{a)(l)(2017).
178
ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-13-103(b) (2017).
179
GA. CODE ANN.§ 19-7-3(c)(l) (2017) (stating that harm may be found where the minor
child resided with the family member for over six months; where the family member provided
financial support for the basic needs of the child for at least one year; where there was "an established pattern of regular visitation or child care by the [grandparent] with the child;" or where other
circumstances indicate that "emotional or physical harm would be reasonably likely" without visitation).
180
N.D. CE.NT. CODE § 14-09-05.l (l) (2017); see a/so Kulbacki v. Michael, 845 N.W.2d 625
(N.D. 2014) (deeming statute constitutional and determining that a trial court must give parents a
favorable presumption and place the burden ofproofon grandparents or great-grandparents); In re
S.B., 845 N.W.2d 317 (N.D. 2014) (applying statute).
1st
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.43(3) (West 2017) (applicable, per (d), to a grandparent who has
maintained, or has tried to maintain a "relationship with the child"). Compare id., with WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 767.43(1) (West 2017) (stating a nonparent, including a grandparent or others, may seek
reasonable visitation and held, in In re Marriage ofMeister, 876 N.W.2d 746, 760 (Wis.2016), to
mean that a grandparent, great-grandparent, or stepparent, Wllike some other nonparents, "need not
prove a parent-child relationship to secure visitation rights").

Nonparental Childcare

2017)

117

[A] stepparent to a minor child born to the other party ... may
be granted reasonable visitation rights ... upon a finding that
such visitation rights would be in the best interests of the minor
child and that such stepparent is actually providing or contributing towards the support of such child. 182

In California, "reasonable visitation to a stepparent" is pennitted if in
"the best interest of the minor child." 183 In Oregon, during a dissolution proceeding, a stepparent can obtain custody or visitation by proving (I) "a child-parent
relationship exists," (2) the presumption that the parent acts in the child's best

interest has been "rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence," and (3) the
child's "best interest" will be served. 184 If a stepparent proves only "an ongoing
personal relationship" with the child, the parental presumption in Oregon must
be rebutted by "clear and convincing evidence." 185 In Utah, a former "stepparent"186 can pursue child custody or visitation in a divorce or "other proceeding"187 through showing by "clear and convincing evidence" that, inter alia, the
stepparent "intentionally assumed the role and obligations of a parent;" formed
"an emotional bond and created a parent-child type relationship;" contributed to
the "child's well being;" and showed the parent is "absent" or has "abused or
neglected the child." 188 In Delaware, "upon the death or disability ofthe custodial
or primary placement parent," a stepparent who resided with the deceased or
disabled parent can request custody even if "there is a surviving natural parent." 189 In Virginia, a former stepparent with a "legitimate interest" 190 can secure
custody of or visitation with a child upon a "showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the best interest of the child would be served." 191 Finally, in Vermont, under case law,
TENN. CooE ANN.§ 36-6-303 (201 7) (seemingly of questionable facial validity under Troxel
without any showings as to, e.g., parental acts or child detriment).
183
CAL. FAM. CODE§ 3101 (West 2017).
184
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109. l l 9(3)(a) (West 2017). "Child-parent relationship" means a relationship, within the past six months, that "fulfilled the child's psychological needs for a parent
as well as the child's physical needs" Id.§ l 09.l 19(10)(a).
185
Id. § I09. l l 9(3)(b). An "ongoing personal relationship" means "a relationship with substantial continuity for at least one year, through interaction, companionship, interplay and mutuality."
Id.§ 109.119(10)(e).
186
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 30-Sa-102(2}(e) (West 2017).
182

187
188
189
190

191

Id.§ 30-5a-l03(4).
Id. § 30-Sa- I 03(2).

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 733 (West 2017).
VA.CODE ANN.§ 20-124.l (2017).
Id. § 20-124.2; see, e.g., Brown v. Burch, 519 S.E.2d 403,412 (Va, Ct. App. 1999)(holding,

over mother's objection, that "clear and convincing evidence of special and unique circumstances"
justified joint custody order favoring father and former stepfather, with the latter "retaining physical custody of the boy"). Beside special statutes, there are some common law rights regarding
childcare for some former stepparents. See, e.g., Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731, 738 (Ark,
2011) (granting former lesbian partner's child visitation order; relying on previously case, Ro binson v. Ford-Robinson, 208 S.W.3d 140 (Ark. 2005), where a stepmother was able to seek visitation

l 18

WEST VJRG!N!A LAW RF.VIEW

(Vol. 120

if a stepparent stands in loco parentis to a child of the marital
household, custody of that child may be awarded to the stepparent if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent is unfit or that extraordinary circumstances exist to
warrant such a custodial order, and that it is in the best interests
of the child for custody to be awarded to the stepparent. 192

Special childcare laws can extend beyond grandparents and stepparents
to other family members where grandparents and stepparents may also be included, either indirectly or directly. For example, in Florida, "an extended family
member" may bring an action for temporary custody of a minor child, with such
a member including a "relative within the third degree by blood or marriage to
the parent" or "the stepparent of a child if the stepparent is currently married to
the parent." 193 In both Arkansas and North Dakota, great-grandparents accompany grandparents in third party visitation laws. 194 In Illinois, the current third
party visitation law includes "grandparents, great-grandparents, step-parents and
siblings." 195
It should be noted that third party childcare orders are sometimes pursued where the ultimate goal has little to do with childcare. For example, a New
York trial court in 200 I appointed the prospective maternal grandparents as
guardians of an eight-month-old fetus, with the consent of the prospective parents, while issuing a "custody and visitation stipulation." 196 The guardianship
was pursued so that the unborn child would be provided with medical coverage
via the insurer of the grandparents. 197 A more common forrn of statutory guardianship, as well as a statutory dependency proceeding, can involve childcare intentions which overlap with third party childcare laws. 1~8
wilh her stepson over the father's objection as long as visitation was in the child's "best interest,"
which was deemed the "polestar consideration"). Special stepparent chi Id care Iaws, of course, may
be coupled with special stepparent adoption laws. See, e.g, LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. !252(A)
(2012) (stating that there is no need for even limited home studies in some intrnfamily, stepparent
adoptions); MONT. CooEANN. § 42-4-302(1)(a) (2017) (granting standing to petition for adoption
to a stepparent who has lived with child and a parent with legal and physical custody for past sixty
days).
192
LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 100 A.3d 345,352 (Vt.2014) (quoting Paquette v. Paquette, 499 A.2d
23, 30 (Vt. 1985)).
193
Mohom v. Thomas, 30 So. 3d 710, 71 l (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 20 I 0) (employing FLA. STAT.
§ 751 .0 l (2017) lo recognize temporary custody of a child in a paternal grandmother).
194
ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-13-L03(b) (West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-09-05.1 (2017).
195
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.9(c) (West 2017).
196
In re Guardianship of Baby K., 727 N.Y.S.2d 283,286 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2001).
191
Id.
198
In Guardianship of Richard C., B247J32, 2014 WL 1316684, at *4--5, *9 (Cal. Dist. Ct,
App. Apr. 2, 2014), the court distinguished between guardianship and dependency as follows:
[P]robate guardianships ... provide an alternative placement for children who
cannot safely remain with their parents .. _ The differences between the probate guardianships and dependency proceedings are significant, .. Probate
guardianships are not initiated by the state, but by private parties, typically
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V L KEY ELEMENTS IN ANY NEW GRANDPARENT CHlJ.OCA RE LAWS

Within the federal constitutional limits set by Troxel, and with guidance
from the NCCUSL, American state lawmakers should begin, or continue, their
exploration of court-compelled connections between grandparents and their
grandchildren. Grandmas like Penny and their grandchildren deserve greater opportunities to secure, through court orders, their continuing beneficial connections. Notwithstanding parental objections, such connections should be available
to promote the best interests of grandchildren and, perhaps, should provide ave1mes for them to evade significant detriments. Such connections can involve
childcare, herein encompassing child custody and/or child visitation orders, or
non-childcare orders, herein encompassing orders on establishing or continuing
contacts between grandparents and their grandchildren which do not involve custody or visitation. 199 Connections beyond custody or visitation are distinguished

family members. They do not entai I proof ofspccifi c statutory grounds demonstrating substantial risk of harm to the child, as is required in dependency proceedings ... Unlike dependency cases, they are not regularly supervised by
the court and a social seivices agency. No governmental entity is a party to the
proceedings. It is the family members and the guardians who detennine, with
court approval, whether a guardianship is established, and thereafter whether
parent and child will be reunited, or the guardianship continued, or an adoption
sought ....
The probate court may appoint a guardian, "if it appears necessary or convenient" (citation omitted). "A relative or other person on behalf of the minor, or
the minor if 12 years of agt: or older, may file a petition for appointment of a
guardian" (citation omitted).
When a parent objects to the guardianship, he or she is entilled to notice and a
hearing (citation omitted). "Early authorities held that in contested guardianship cases, parents were entitled to retain custody unless affinnatively found
unfit .... However, Ilic unfitness standard fell out of favor and the best interest
of the child, as determined under the custody statutes, became the controlling
consideration ....
In determining the minor's best interests ... [the Family Code] specifies the
order of preference as: ( 1) joint custody of ei lher parent; (2) a person in whose
home the minor is living in a wholesome and stable environment; and (3) any
person deemed suitable by the court who can provide adequate and proper care
and guidance for the minor ....
Before granting custody to a nonparent over a parent's objection, "the court
shall make a finding that granting custody to a parent would be detrimental to
the child and that granting custody to the nonparent is required to serve the
best interest of the child" (citation omitted).
A finding of detriment does not require any finding of unfitness of the parents
(citation omitted). [A] parent who loses ... custody ... is not foreclosed from
regaining custody based on changed circumstances.
199

We employ the terms custody, visitation, and child contact orders even though we
acknowledge that some state lawmakers, like those in Illinois, have moved away from child custody and visitation to employ the terms allocations of parental decision-making and allocations of
p!lrental responsibilities.
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by their lack of regular and consistent physical ties. Tims, they embody orders
facilitating regular or periodic communications between grandparents and grandchildren, by email, post, Skype, or other periodic (i.e. non-regular) or one-time
physical encounters which may include overnight stays, for example.
We next address the key elements demanding consideration when new
or amended grandparent childcare laws are explored. 200 Later, we exam.ine possible laws on child contact orders, which, to date, have not been significantly
embodied in statutes or common law precedents.
A.

What ls Grandparent Childcare?

As noted, grandparent childcare orders herein encompass judicial orders
granting grandchild custody and/or visitation. In some states, such orders employ
different terms. 201 Such orders often originate from case settlements between one
or more parent(s) and one or more grandparent(s), including friendly proceedings
wherein grandchild care is sought to be more firmly secured (as compared, e.g.,
to agreements outside of court orders). Grandchild care can also result from adversarial proceedings arising from disputes between parents and grandparents
over new or continuing grandchild care.
As with childcare disputes between parents, or between parents and nonparents beyond grandparents, grandparent custody orders are, and should be,
more difficult to secure than grandparent visitation orders. Any such orders
should also be more difficult to secure than a non-childcare order recognizing (in
an agreement) or mandating (by a judge) certain grandparent-grandchild contacts.
Within any state, the meaning of child custody, child visitation, and child
contact orders should be uniform, comparably applicable to all nonparents and
parents or alleged parents who petition courts. Uniformity avoids confusion to
judges, lawyers, and litigants. Given existing federal constitutional parental
childcare interests, but no federal constitutional nonparental childcare interests
as yet, petitions for parentage recognitions in childcare disputes should be processed distinctly from petitions for nonparental childcare. To date, required federal constitutional childcare interests have been generally limited in federal judicial precedents to biological (actual or presumed, as with husbands) and formal
adoptive parents, though state laws may extend parental childcare interests to
others (like de facto parents) who would then receive federal constitutional protections. 202

We do not explore grandparent childcare rights when there are ongoing parental rights termination proceedings. See, e.g., T.T. v. C.E., 204 So. 3d 436 (Ala_ Civ. App. 2016).
201
See, e g., N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 40-l0B-5 (West 2017) (referring to the child being "raised"
by "kinship caregiver" for one who seeks an appointment of a guardian for a child).
202
See, e.g., Parness, Federal Constitutional Childcare, supra note I, at 972-75.
200
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Who Should Establish Grandparent Childcare Laws?

Unlike parental childcare interests, there are as yet no federal constitutional childcare interests benefitting grandparents. This leaves significant discretion as to who within each state should craft grandparent childcare norms, within
the Troxel limits, of course. Here, unlike parental childcare settings, 203 there has
been very little state judicial common lawmaking that is untethered to state statutory schemes. 204 And there has been little, if any, state constitutional lawmaking
benefitting grandparents, even where independent state constitutional interpretation has recognized parental interests extending beyond federal constitutional
childcare interests. 205 For now, state legislators will provide for any grandparent
childcare interests, whether embodied within general or special nonparcnt childcare statutes. Many of these lawmakers likely will be lobbied to craft new provisions benefitting grandparents and their grandchildren once the NCCUSL model
acts are completed.
C.

Separate Nonparent Childcare Laws for Grandparents?

Both the NPCCVA and the RUPA (in each alternate form) drafts in 2017
fail to recognize any special childcare standing for grandparents. Grandparents
may petition for custody or visitation under the NPCCVA if they meet the separate, general standing nonns for nonparents. Additionally, per either version of
the RUPA, a grandparent may be labeled a "de facto parent." These approaches
to grandparent childcare differ from some current American state statutes where
special grandparent childcare standing exists. Such special laws may be accompanied by other special childcare laws, for stepparents or siblings, for example,
which can, but need not, be distinct. They may also be joined by general laws,
like those contemplated in the NPCCVA and RUPA drafts, which can include
203
Examples of both statutory and common law directives on parents in childcare settings are
found in Parness, Parentage Law,supra note 92, at 753--63, The separation of powers issues arising
in these settings are reviewed in Jeffrey A Parness, State Lawmolang on Federal Constitutional
Childcare Parents: More Principled Aflocations of Powers and More Rational Distinctions, 50
CREJGHTON L. REV. 479 (2017).
204
Grandparent and other nonparent childcare statutes are reviewed in Atkinson, supra note
134, apps. at 18-34. Illustrative of untethered judicial common lawmaking on nonparental childcare are reviewed in Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253, 255--56 (S.D. 1991) (quoting Langerman
v. Langerman, 336 N.W.2d 669,670 (S.D. 1983) (requiring, upon parental objection, a finding of
"gross misconduct or unfitness, or other of extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of
the child"); Quinn v. Mouw-Quinn, 552 N,W.2d 843, 846 (S.D. 1996) (finding "extraordinary circumstances" in allowing childcare by former stepparent). But see id. at 849 (Amundson, J., dissenting) (arguing that "South Dakota Legislature must make the decision"). In addition, compare
Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 592 (Minn. 2012) (engaging in no common lawmaking on
child visitation in absence of statute unless child visi talion petitioners stand "in loco parentis"),
with In re Will eke, 160 A.3d 688, 691 (N.H. 2017).
205
Parental childcare, though not grandparent childcare, interests are specially protected in
Iowa, for example. See Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Iowa 1999).
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grandparents. Thus, grandparent childcare orders may arise today from eilher a
general or a special statute.
Special grandparent childcare laws can be founded on distinct, or a combination of varied, public policies. One policy wuld involve the import of biological ties to family relations. Here then, biological grandparents would be distinguished from other grandparents, like step-grandparents. 206 /\dditionally, a
public policy could effectively prefer younger grandparents in childcare settings
hy distinguishing between grandparents and great-grandparents in special laws.
Yet another public policy could involve a recognition of the import of longerstanding family relationships, with or without biological ties. Here, childcare by
former step-grandparents would be distinguished from childcare by those who
were grandparents at the moment their children became parents. Further, public
policy could involve a special recognition of the positive roles played by grandparents in the lives of their grandchildren, as demonstrated, for example, by social science evidence. Here, the standards on court-ordered childcare opportunities for grandparents may be relaxed as compared to the opportunities afforded
other nonparents who also seek childcare orders over parental objections.
When drafting new grandparent childcare laws, there are a number of
questions lawmakers should ask. If there are to be special grandparent childcare
laws, how should eligible grandparents be defined? If step-grandparents are to
be included, should they include fonner as well as current step-grandparents?
Further, should any special laws encompass all or some great-grandparents, as is
done in some current American state statutes?207 Finally, should grandparent
childcare standing be dependent upon the continuing parental childcare interests
of their children? Or should grandparent standing be independent, and thus not
based on who are now childcare parents? If dependent, should grandparents only
lose opportunities for grandchild care because their children failed to grasp or
lost their superior parental rights? To the Authors, the acts (sins) of parents
should not automatically foreclose at least continuing healthy relationships between grandparents and their grandchildren. But where parental sins do foreclose
certain grandparents, for example, to avoid interference with family structures
that then exist, grandparents could still be granted childcare standing, perhaps
under more stringent norms, when their children or non-child-caring parents are
sinless, as when the parents are deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated for reasons unrelated to their earlier parenting. 208

206
And if, for example, step-grandparents are included, they could include all former as well
as current step-grandparents, or only a subset of former step-grandparents, like those whose own
children (i.e., the stepparents) are decea.,ed and thus unable to facilitate grandparent-grandchild
connections. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:13(1) (2017) (permitting grandparents,
"whether adoptive or natural," to seek grandchild visitation).
207
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-](a)-{b) (2017) (including but distinguishing the rights of
grandparents and great-grandparents, as only the former can file "original" actions for visitation).
208
In Georgia, grandparents must show "by clear and convincing evidence that the heallh or
welfare of the child would be harmed unless ... visitation is granted," as long as the child's parents
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D. Separate Parent Childcare /,awsfor Grandparents?
Grandparents may seek childcare orders upon judicial determinations
that they qualify as non-biological and nonadoptive parents. As noted, parentage
designations for current grandparents (and other nonparents) arise under varying
doctrines, including de facto parenthood, presumed parent, and equitable adoption. Where such doctrines operate, should they distinguish between grandparents (however defined) and other nonparents aspiring to obtain legal parentage?
To date, while there are many special nonparent childcare laws benefitting just
grandparents, there are no comparable special parent childcare laws solely for
grandparents. 209
However, if grandparents are covered in general and/or separate nonparent childcare laws, should special conditions be placed on grandparents who
seek to become childcare parents when current parents object? For example,
should standing be limited to biological grandparents whose children were parents, but who died and thus are now unable to facilitate child connections? Or,
should parentage standing extend to step-grandparents whose children were stepparents, but who died and thus are now unable to facilitate child connections? In
answering, American state lawmakers must determine the import of biological
ties.
Further, should a condition of any grandparent seeking childcare parentage be the continuing recognition of the childcare parentage in the child of the
petitioning grandparent? If so, one parent may be driven to terminate the parental
rights of another parent whose own parents desire childcare, even where the other
parent has no custody/visitation but has a continuing duty to provide child support. Here, the loss of parental child support and the loss of possible grandparentgrandchild connections would each disserve the grandchild. Again, to us, it
seems unfair to saddle loving grandparents with the sins of their children, as well
as to deny grandchildren the care of their (one-time) grandparents that would
serve their best interests.

"are not separated and the child is living with both parents." Id.§ 19-7-3 (a)(l), (c)(l), (b)(3). Yet
if the child of the grandparent (that is, the parent of the child) is "deceased, incapacitated or incarcerated," grandparent visitation can follow proofof"best interests of the child." Id.§ 19-7-3(d).
Compare id., with KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 405.021(1), (3) (West 2017) (stating that termination of
parental rights does not adversely affect grandparent visits already established if in grandchild's
best interests; yet if parent dies, new grandchild visitation order depends upon grandparent assuming "the financial obligation of child support owed by the deceased parent").
209
Like its predecessors, RUP A also does not recognize special presumed or de facto parentage
nomis applicable just to grandparents. REV. UNJF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 204(a) (UNII'. LAW COMM'N,
Annual Meeting Drafl, July 2017) ("individual" is presumed); id. § 609 ("individual" may be de
facto).
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When Can Parental Objections to Grandparent Childcare Be
Overcome?

As noted earlier, de facto parenthood laws suggest new approaches to
meet the Troxel "special weight" requirement for nonparent childcare orders over
current parental objections. New parentage designations without biological or
formal adoption ties, but with the child's best interest served, have often been
justified by an earlier ceding of parental authority, demonstrated by consent to
or acquiescence in the development of parental-like relationships between the
child and nonparent caretaker who can later become a de facto parent. Thus, a
bi1th or fonnal adoptive parent's earlier wishes, or other voluntary acts regarding
a nonparent's childcare, diminish the weight accorded later parental objections
when possible new de facto parentage is considered.210 Here, detriment to the
child should not be required for a de facto parent to be recognized. The RUPA
proposals on presumed and de facto childcare parentage recognize this. 2 11
The New Jersey Supreme Court described the impact of earlier parental
ceding of childcare authority on later judicial deference to parental wishes as
follows:
This opinion should not be viewed as an incursion on the general
right of a fit legal parent to raise his or her child without outside
interference. What we have addressed here is a specific set of
circumstances involving the volitional choice of a legal parent
to cede a measure of parental authority to a third party; to allow
that party to function as a parent in the day-to-day life of the
child; and to fosler the forging of a parental bond between the
third party and the child. In such circumstances, the legal parent
has created a family with the third party and the child, and has
invited the third party into the otherwise inviolable realm of
family privacy. By virtue of her own actions, the legal parent's
The earlier parental acts may have occurred before the child's birth, as is done with a pact
between a same sex female couple on the employment by one of the partners of assisted reproductive technologies. Such pre-birth acts are deemed by some judges as best left to the legislature
because judicial involvement opens the door wide and waves everyone-including neighbors and
even baby sitters-into parenthood. See, e.g., Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Ky.
20 I 0) (declaring in a case involving assisted reproduction and a lesbian couple's pact, "we adjudge
that there can be a waiver of some part of custody rights demonstrating an intent to co-parent a
child with a nonparent"); id. at 583 (Cunningham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that •~udicia1 engineering undennines the statutory protection of the parent and opens the
door wide for all third parties who can show shared participation in child rearing," including
"grandparents, uncles, aunts, neighbors and even babysitters").
211
See, e.g., REv. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 204(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW CoMM'N, Annual Meeting
Draft July 2017) (presumed parent resides in household for first two years ofchild's life and openly
holds out child as the individual's own); id. § 609(d)(6) {where only then one parent, a de facto
parent can be designated where, e.g., the current sole parent "fostered or supported" a "bonded and
dependent relationship" between the child and would-be de facto parent). Compare id., with id.
§ 613(c), AJtemative B (more than two parents possible where otherwise "detriment to the child").
210
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expectation of autonomous privacy in her relationship with her
child is necessarily reduced from that which would have been
the case had she never invited the third party into their lives.
Most important, where that invitation and its consequences have
altered her child's life by essentially giving him or her another
parent, the legal parent's options are constrained. It is the child's
best interest that is preeminent as it would be if two legal parents
were in a conflict over custody and visitation. 212
Comparably, the necessary weight accorded current parental objections
to grandparent childcare should be diminished if earlier parental wishes, or other
voluntary acts, facilitated beneficial relationshjps between the grandchildren and
their grandparents whose continuing childcare would serve the best interests of
the grandchildren. A finding of a need to avoid harm or potential harm to the
grandchild should be unnecessary, as implicitly recognized, though in limited
settings, in a 2017 NPCCVA Draft. 213 Current parental objections to continuing
grandparent childcare could be afforded less weight, for example, where the parent earlier consented to a child custody transfer to the grandparent. 214
The 2002 American Law Tnstitute (ALI) Principles recognized that such
diminished weight could be accorded current parental objections to continued
third party childcare. 215 They declared that current objections to third party childcare by fit single parents could be overcome where the parents had not been "performing a reasonable share of parenting functions" and grandparents (or other
relatives) developed "significant" relationships with the children.216 This recognition embodies the view that passive acquiescence by a single parent in the development of such a relationship limits later parental decision-making on the

212

V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539, 553-54 (N.J. 2000). A comparable rationale (also involving,
as in VC., a former lesbian couple) was employed in Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 505
(N.C. 2010), which unfortunately characterized the voluntary ceding ofparent<1l authority to an
intimate partner as acting "inconsistently with" the "paramount parental status" but not employed
in Sides v. Ikner, 730 S.E.2d 844, 854 (N.C. Ct. App, 2012), which found that a parent did not
intentionally choose to create a parental role for a grandparent; see also Masitto v. Masitto, 488
N.E.2d 857,860 (Ohio 1986) (looking only to child's best interest in childcare dispute where father
earlier consented to guardianship by maternal grandparents, with his consent incorporated into the
father's divorce decree).
213
NONPARENTAL CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION Acr § 106(a)(l) (UN!F. LAW. Cow.1'N.,
Annual Meeting Draft July 2017) (stating that a nonparent has standing to seek childcare over
parents' current objection if the nonparent acted as a "consistent caretaker of the child for six or
more consecutive months" or "since the birth of the child" for a child less than six months of age
where "a parent ... explicitly or tacitly accepted the development of a bonded and dependent relationship between the child and the nonparent").
214
See, e.g., S.M. v. R.M., 92 A.3d 1128, 1139--40 (D.C. 2014) (finding no consent as birth
mother was led to believe she was agreeing to temporary custody while she attended drug treatment
program).
215
See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 134, § 2.18.
216
Id. § 2.18(2)(a).
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continuation of such a relationship. 217 The AU Principles also declared that diminished weight in childcare disputes could be accorded to the current objections
of a single parent ( often an unwed birth mother) who earlier agreed with a biological parent of a child who "is not the chi ld's legal parent" (often a man whose
sex with the single birth mother prompted the birth of the child) that such a nonparent "retained some parental rights or responsibilities." 218 Jn both settings, the
ALI Principles contemplated that there need not be "hann to the child" for childcare responsibilities to be judicially assigned to at least some nonparents. 219
In accordance with these principles, and comparable to many de facto
parent laws, comt-compelled continuing grandparent childcare over current parental objections can be justified when there was earlier parental acquiescence in
the childcare and when the child's best interests will be served even though the
absence of such continuing childcare will not prompt harm or potential hann to
the child.
While findings as to the best interests of a child should always precede
any court-compelled grandparent childcare, 220 state lawmakers who wish to recognize more than the minimal requisites of parental "1 iberty interests" could demand that there also be judicial findings of harm or potential harm to children.
However, such a demand would be nonsensical in some settings. For example,
consider state lawmakers who do not require findings of harm or potential harm
before de facto childcare parents can be newly-recognized. Parental liberty interests are much less significantly devalued in grandparent childcare settings than
in de facto parent childcare settings.
State lawmakers who desire more secure parental liberty interests could
also demand express, rather than implicit, parental consent to earlier grandparent
childcare before grandparent childcare might be ordered over parental objections. 221 Further, legislators could differentiate between the standards applicable
to varying grandparents by making standing easier to attain for a biologicallytied grandparent than for a former step-grandparent because only in the former
setting might there be said to be a continuing family relationship.
By contrast, state lawmakers could opt to recognize less secure parental
liberty interests. They could choose, for example, to follow Justice Stevens's ob-

Id.
m
Id.§ 2.J8(2)(b).
219
Id. § 2. l 8(2)(c) (providing that "hann to the child" can by itself support judges allocating
childcare re.c;ponsibility to nonparents over current parental objections).
no
As to what constitutes a child's best interest served by grandparent childcare, see Walker v.
Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 87 l (Ky. 2012), and Smith v. Martin, 222 So. 3d 255, 259-60 (Miss. 2017).
221
See, e.g., NONPAREN"fAL CHILD Cusroov AND VISITATION ACT § 106(a)(I) (UNJF. LAW.
COMM'N., Annual Meeting Draft July 2016) (need for residence with the child fornonparent childcare standing, as well as "consistent" caretaking and 1:xplicit or tacit acceptance ofdevelopment of
a relationship by "a parent"). Compare id., with id. § 106(a)(2) (no need for such acceptance or
residence where nonparent "has a substantial relationship with the child" and "denial of custody or
visitation would result in [detriment] to the child").
211
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servation in Troxel by ruling that some grandchildren (and perhaps some grandparents) have "fundamental liberty interests" in "preserving established familial
or family-like bonds."222
Deference to parental liberty interests can also be calibrated by the degree of proof required to overcome current parental objections to grandparent
childcare. For example, in contemporary grandparent childcare laws, either a
preponderance of the evi<lence223 or a clear and convincing evidence224 standard
could be used. Of course, different standards could be employed for different
issues in the same grandparent childcare case. Thus, a higher standard may be
required, for example, on earlier parental acquiescence and a lower standard on
the current nature of the grandparent-grandchild relationship. 225
F. Better Facilitate Compliance with Grandparent Childcare Orders?
As Grandma Penny knows, not all grandparent childcare orders are
obeyed. Criminal contempt, as was the case with Jennifer, can serve to prompt
compliance. But state lawmakers should consider whether additional compliance
incentives are needed and, if so, whether they should specifically address disobedience of grandparent childcare orders.

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103(c) (West 2017) (stating that a grandparent who petitions a court for a "reasonable" grandchild visitation order must overcome a parental objection by
a "preponderance of the evidence" as to a "significant and viable relationship" with the grandchikl
and as to the grandchild's "best interest" being served with such an order); In re JR.A., No.
13CAJ8, 2014 WL 5089173, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014) (citing In Re C.J.L., No.
13CA3545, 2014 WL 1691638, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2014) ("In a child-custody proceeding between a parent and a nonparent, a court may not award custody to the nonparent without first
determining that the parent is unsuitable to raise the child, i.e., without <letennining by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent abandoned the child, contractually relinquished custody of
the child, or has become totally i neap able of supporting or caring for the chi] d, or that an award of
custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child.")).
224
See, e.g., KY. RTiv. STAT. ANN.§ 403.270(I)(b) (West 2017) (de facto custodian must be
proven by "clear and continuing evidence"); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(8) (2017) (similar);
Hunter v. Hunter, 771 N.W.2d 694, 713 (Mich. 2009) (no grant of child custody to third parties
unless third parties "demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence" parental custody "does not
serve the children's best interests"); Mullins v. Neely, No. 2013-CA-001876-ME, 2014 WL
2938621, at •2 (Ky. Ct. App. June 27, 2014) (waiver of superior parental eights requires clear and
convincing evidence).
225
For example, in California, a child custody award to a third party over parental objection
generally requires a finding that parental custody "would be detrimental to the child," which must
be "supported by clear and convincing evidence." CAL. FAM. CODE§ 3041(a}--{d) (West 2017).
Yet whereby a showing of preponderance of the evidence, the third party has been shown to have
"assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of. .. parent, fulfilling both the child's physical needs
and ... psychological needs for care and affection ... for a substantial period of time," this finding
means "parental custody would be detrimental to the child absent a showing by a preponderance
of the evidence to the contrary." Id. But "the evidentiary standards" differ when "the child is an
Indian chi Id." Id. § 304 I (e).
222

m
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Tort claims, whether founded on intentional or negligent conduct, are
possibly available for harm to grandparents caused through the infliction of emotional distress. Such claims should even be available against those who were not
directly subject to a court childcare order and who did not aid or abet a violation
of it (e.g., by a parent subject to such an order). 226 Recall that Sidney was in the
custody of Jennifer's father, Robert, while Jennifer was in jail. During that time,
Robert's denial of contact by between Sidney and Penny, if contact was sought
by Penny, should be actionable in tort, even where Robert was not a named party
in, or otherwise subject to, the Illinois 2010 visitation order. 227
Further, parental noncompliance with grandparent (and with other third
party) childcare orders could he explicitly deemed pertinent in any later parental
fitness proceeding. 228

G. Grandparent Child Contact Orders
As noted, we support laws on grandparent-grandchild contact orders that
are distinct from childcare orders-that is, from custody or visitation orders.
Such contact orders could contemplate, for example, regular and consistent connections without physical ties, by email, post, or Skype, for example. They also
could contemplate some physical ties, as seen with orders on periodic (i.e., nonregular) or one-time personal encounters, which may include overnight stays.
Child contact orders may, but need not, include requirements on facilitating grandparent-grandchild contacts by parents, guardians and the like. Such
orders could require affirmative acts, like arranging, or helping to accomplish,
grandparent-grandchild meetings. They could require passive acts, like not interfering with email or Skype communications.
Child contact orders, independent of any judicial directive on custody or
visitation, are often not expressly recognized in current nonparent childcare laws.
When there is recognition, unfortunately sometimes there is a failure to appreciate how grandparent child contact laws can supplement grandparent childcare

226
Though not a named party, Robert might still be held accountable in contempt for violating
the visitation order ifhe had notice. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-101 (equitable order
"binding" upon "those persons in active concert or participation" with parties when they "receive
actual notice") and FED. R. CN. P. 65(d)(2) (similar).
m
Further, might a tort claim also be pursued against Jennifer's one-time fiance from Massachusetts? Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (regarding liability for "extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly caus[ing] severe emotional distress to another"),
with Vonfeldt v. Grapsy, No. 1: lcvl 179, 2017 WL 590337, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 14, 2017) (recognizing alienation of affection and criminal conversation torts under North Carolina laws on interference with marital relations).
228
See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (D) (West 2017) ("[u]nfit person" to have a child
makes no reference to willful failure to comply with childcare order benefitting others); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260C.301 (West 2017) (no mention of noncompliance as a rationale for terminating
parental rights); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4198.504 (West 2017) (parental rights termination factors
do not include failure to comply with nonparental (or parental) childcare order).
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laws. Recall, for example, the 2016 Illinois nonparent visitation statute which
speaks to pursuit of "visitation and electronic communication" order, but not
solely to an electronic communication order. 229 By comparison, an Oregon law
on ongoing "personal" relationships between grandparents and grandchildren
recognizes there can be, over parental objections, court-ordered "visitation or
contact rights. " 230
A child contact order could benefit greatly a Grandma Penny when Jennifer maintained custody of Sidney and moved her a great distance from Penny.
Recall that the 2016 Illinois law reforms allowed grandparent and certain others231 to pursue only "visitation and electronic communication" with a child. 232
A request for an order prompting electronic communications between Penny and
Sidney (or Robert and Sidney, or even Sidney and her paternal aunt and uncle in
Virginia) should not also require a request for an accompanying visitation request. Further, recall that the 2016 Illinois law reforms only would authorize an
electronic communication order involving Penny and Sidney where a denial of
visitation between Penny and Sidney by Jennifer has caused Sidney "undue mental, physical, or emotional harm." 233 To the Authors, this goes too far in protecting superior parental rights and not far enough in protecting the interests of
grandparents and grandchildren.
VII. CONCLUSION

Current childcare and child contact laws generally provide inadequate
opportunities for continuing grandparent-grandchild connections serving the best
interests of grandchildren without unduly infringing upon the superior parental
rights of objecting parents. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is now contemplating new model childcare principles. It should
consider allowing expanded grandparent childcare opportunities, as well as separate child contact opportunities.
American state legislators should enhance the opportunities for judicial
orders on grandparent childcare and child contact. In formulating new laws, they
should consider, inter alia, whether separate laws are needed just for grandparents; how to define grandparents if there are to be separate laws; how superior
parental rights should be protected; and when superior parental childcare rights
may be overcome to serve the best interest of grandchildren (and their loving

229
230
231

750 ILL. COMJ'. STAT. ANN. 5/602.9(c) (West 2017).
OR. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 109.119 (3)(b) (West2017).
750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.9(c) (West 2017).
232
Id. Compare id., with OR. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 109.l 19(3)(b) (West 2017) (providing that a
court may grant "visitation or contact rights" to those with an "ongoing personal relationship").
m
750 ILL, COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.9(c)(l) (West 2017). Additional conditions in the 2016
Illinois law also preclude Penny from seeking a child contact order. Id. (l)(A-E) (e.g., one parent
does not object to visitation).
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grandparents), In doing so, state legislators should take into account the unfortunate consequences for grandchildren and grandparents, like Sidney and Penny,
that can occur where legal remedies are inadequate. New laws are needed to preserve the loving relationships between grandchildren and their grandparents,
while respecting parental rights.

